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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

ANDREW R. QUINTANA,

:

Case No. 880406-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant, :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for Burglary, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978),
and Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-6-404 (1978).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (1982) (Supp.
1988) and S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) (Supp. 1988).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the
following provisions:
1.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30 (1982).

2.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978).

3.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-402(1) (1978).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the prosecutor's remarks during his opening

statement to the jury, where he may have alluded to a fact which

was suppressed prior to trial, was substantially prejudicial to
defendant and warrants reversal of his conviction or whether the
remark was harmless error.
2.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support

defendant's conviction for burglary and theft.
3.

Whether Jury Instruction 19 was supported by

sufficient factual basis and whether such instruction was proper
because it did not relieve the State of its burden of proof by
creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Andrew R. Quintana, was charged with
Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1978), and Theft, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978).
Defendant was convicted of the charges on May 25, 1988,
following a two-day jury trial, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by

Judge Uno to a term of one to fifteen years on the second degree
felony and zero to five years on the third degree felony to be
served concurrently following his current prison term.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 25, 1987, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the
Ted John family left their home at 1162 South Emery Street,
located in Salt Lake County, for a short trip to Zion's National
Park (R. 118 at 27, 39). When the John family returned home on
September 27, 1987, around 4t00-6t00 p.m., they found a note from
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the police attached to their door indicating that their home had
been burglarized.

The note indicated an investigation had been

started, and requested that the Johns contact the police (R. 118
at 29).
Mr. John inventoried the house and reported that YAMAHA
stereo equipment, valued at approximately $800, was missing (R.
118 at 31). Specifically, an amplifier, cassette player and
tuner were absent, together with the connecting wires or patch
cords (R. 118 at 31-32, 40). The amplifier and the cassette
player both measured fourteen inches by six inches by ten inches,
with the amplifier weighing ten to fifteen pounds and the
cassette player approximately two pounds (R. 118 at 43, 44). The
tuner measured fourteen inches by three inches by ten inches and
weighed approximately two pounds (R. 118 at 43-44).

Mr. John

later discovered and reported that a canister-type vacuum cleaner
was also missing (R. 118 at 31). The vacuum cleaner, together
with an accompanying hose attachment, was valued at approximately
$100 (R. 118 at 31).
At approximately 11:30 a.m. that morning, a neighbor
living across the street from the John residence was returning
home from the grocery store (R. 118 at 57). The neighbor,
Patricia Rains, testified that, as she arrived home, she observed
a burgundy Mazda pickup truck parked on the street and an
individual standing on the porch of the John home (R. 118 at 5859).

As she turned into her driveway, and from an unobstructed

distance of approximately 30 feet, Mrs. Rains was immediately
able to identify the individual standing upon the porch as the
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defendant, Andrew R. Quintana (R. 118 at 61, 79). Mrs. Rains
thought to herself, "That's Andy", recognizing his truck and
wondering if he had been stranded (R. 118 at 59-61, 68). Mrs.
Rains had never personally met defendant before but knew who he
was.

Mrs. Rains often saw defendant while on her way to work

(including only a few days prior to the burglary/theft) (R. 118
at 68-70) and at other times, having "little sisters that
always—when we go in the car somewhere . . . are always saying
there is so-and-so" (R. 118 at 78, 79).

Mrs. Rains later told

her husband that she "knew of him" (R. 118 at 76). Mrs. Rains
watched defendant for approximately five minutes, indicating that
at various times he knocked on the door, looked in the mailbox,
peeked through the large picture window at the front of the John
house, and looked around (R. 118 at 59-60).

She described

defendant as approximately five-feet-six-inches tall, wearing
colorful Bermuda shorts and a T-shirt, the color of which she
could not recall (R. 118 at 62). After standing on the porch for
several minutes, defendant returned to the Mazda pickup truck and
drove away (R. 118 at 62-63, 90).
Mrs. Rains' husband, Calvin Dean Rains, testified that
he observed the individual on the Johns' porch from a distance of
80-90 feet (R. 118 at 87, 100). Mr. Rains had previously
observed the individual park his truck down the street from the
John home (R. 118 at 88, 89). He described the vehicle as either
a Mazda or Nissan dark maroon pickup truck, two-wheel drive, with
Mrs. Rains testified that she had seen defendant "several
times" (R. 118 at 79), and believed that defendant may have even
been at her home with her sister (R. 118 at 70).
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the suspension lowered and with the front grill "broken out
around the headlight." (R. 118 at 89-90).

He was also able to

note the license plate number of the truck as 5600AK, which was
later reported to police (R. 118 at 50, 65-66, 90). Mr. Rains
watched the man leave the truck and walk to the John home.

He

described the individual as a Spanish or Mexican male in his midtwenties, approximately five-feet-six to -seven-inches tall, with
light to medium semi-wavy black hair (R. 118 at 87). Mr. Rains
also testified that the individual was wearing multicolored
Bermuda shorts and a very large tank top ("several sizes larger
2
than average. Really big.") (R. 118 at 87-88).

Mr. Rains, as

had his wife, observed the man "nosing around on the front porch
acting suspicious." (R. 118 at 88-89).

He testified that the

individual "looked like he checked through the mailbox, looked in
through the window and checked the front door . . . [h]e opened
the screen, looked like he was shaking the knob to see if it was
unlocked or locked" (R. 118 at 89).
Mr. Rains then testified that a couple of minutes
later, he (Mr. Rains) went to his truck and headed back to the
store for additional groceries (R. 118 at 90). As he pulled out
of the driveway and around the corner, he spotted the same
vehicle parked directly across from an alleyway that ran behind
the John home (R. 118 at 91). Mr. Rains, believing the
circumstances to be rather suspicious, decided to stop and see
what he could observe. He was initially unable to see the
2
Mr. Rains later clarified what he meant by tank top, indicating
an article of clothing similar to a T-shirt with sleeves (R. 118
at 101-103).
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individual, but within a few moments, he saw a person come out of
the alleyway (R. 118 at 92-93).

He testified that the man he saw

come out of the alley was the same man that he had seen on the
porch (R. 118 at 93). The individual coming from the alley
initially walked toward the maroon Mazda pickup truck, but,
having spotted Mr. Rains in his vehicle, he turned around and
started walking in the opposite direction.

After a couple of

steps, the man turned once again and headed directly for the
pickup truck (R. 118 at 93). Mr. Rains observed the individual
carrying a large bulky object underneath his shirt (R. 118 at
94).

The individual entered his pickup truck and drove directly

by Mr. Rains (R. 118 at 95). Mr. Rains then returned to his home
and told his wife that he believed that someone had been robbed
and they should call the police (R. 118 at 95). Mr. Rains, his
wife, and some neighbors, proceeded to the backyard of the John
home and observed that a back door and window were open with a
window screen removed (R. 118 at 95-96).

Mr. Rains also

testified that weeds growing in the backyard of the John home,
alongside the fence, directly adjacent to the alley where Mr.
Rains had observed the suspicious individual, had been trampled
down.

He said it "looked like somebody had climbed over the

fence" (R. 118 at 96-97).

Mrs. Rains then called the police and

reported the crime, giving defendant's name, his physical
description, the vehicle description and the license number Mr.
Rains had written down (R. 118 at 64-66, 96).
Police Officer Chris Adhearn received a dispatch that
day at 11:54 a.m. summoning him to 1162 Emery Street (R. 118 at
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46-47).

He spoke with Mr. and Mrs. Rains and received

descriptions of the vehicle and the individual.

The description

given was a male Hispanic, dark hair, approximately five-feetseven-inches tall and 130 pounds (R. 118 at 47).

The vehicle was

described as a Mazda pickup truck, maroon in color with chrome
trim and a damaged grill, license plate number 5600AK (R. 118 at
47, 50). Upon investigating the John residence, Officer Adhearn
found that the back door to the home was open, and there was
damage to a side window where a screen had been torn away (R. 118
at 47-48).

Inside the home, it appeared to Officer Adhearn that

several pieces of stereo equipment were missing and, inside of a
bedroom, drawers had been partially pulled out of a dresser (R.
118 at 48). Officer Adhearn observed, as had Mr. Rains, that it
appeared that someone had walked through the weeds in the
backyard toward the alley because the weeds were partially
trampled (R. 118 at 49, 54).
Officer Adhearn's report was given to headquarters,
which issued an Attempt to Locate for the suspect vehicle.

Later

that same day, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Officer Robert
Robinson of the Salt Lake Police Department spotted and stopped a
Mazda pickup truck, maroon with chrome trim, having a license
plate number almost identical to that earlier reported by the
Rains (only a single digit difference—3600AK as opposed to
5600AK) (R. 119 at 4, 5). The driver of the vehicle pulled over
was identified as defendant (R. 119 at 5).

Officer Robinson

informed defendant that he would impound the truck as a suspect
vehicle in a burglary (R. 119 at 8).
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Officer Robinson indicated

that Mr. Quintana was wearing a blue pullover shirt with grey
Bermuda-type shorts (R. 119 at 9). He also noted that on the
passenger seat of the truck was some type of wiring apparatus
which he seized.

The wiring apparatus was eventually introduced

at trial as Exhibit One and identified as patch cords for a
stereo system (R. 119 at 9),

Mr. John later testified that the

patch cords were very similar to those stolen from his home, in
that these specific patch cords were produced primarily for use
with YAMAHA equipment ("I recognize that as unique for YAMAHA
brand of stereo.") (R. 118 at 33, 42). Officer Robinson
testified that defendant's vehicle was stopped within three to
four blocks of defendant's residence and approximately five to
six miles from the scene of the burglary/theft (R. 119 at 11).
Officer Robinson indicated that when he questioned defendant
about his activities that morning, his answers were confusing and
conflicting (R. 119 at 7, 8). Defendant finally left on foot and
proceeded home (R. 119 at 8).
At trial, defendant's mother, Beulah Gonzales, and
sister, Jerline Quintana, both testified.

Beulah Gonzales

testified that defendant lived with her and her husband (R. 119
at 25). She testified that she could not recall her son owning a
pair of colorful Bermuda shorts (R. 119 at 26). She further
testified that on September 27, 1988, between approximately
10:15 - 11:45 a.m., defendant was left home alone and neither she
nor her husband could account for his whereabouts during that
period of time (R. 119 at 29, 30). Jerline Quintana testified
that defendant helped her move a washer and dryer between 1:00-
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2:00 p.m. on one day during the weekend of the burglary/theft,
but she could not recall whether that was Saturday, September
27th, or Sunday, the 28th (R. 119 at 20-22).
Further, defendant's brother, Jack Quintana, testified
that he was the owner of the maroon-colored chrome-trimmed pickup
truck and there was damage to the front end of the truck, in that
the front grill was missing. (R. 119 at 46)

Jack Quintana

further testified that he believed the patch cords seized by the
police from the truck were his; although he conceded that at the
time of the impoundment he was in jail for a felony conviction of
burglary himself, and the last time he had seen the patch cords
they were in the bottom of the seat of his truck and not up on
the passenger seat (R. 119 at 41, 45-46).

Upon cross

examination, Jack further conceded that he had been convicted of
as many as four other felonies since 1982 including burglary,
assault, theft, and escape from prison (R. 119 at 40-41).
Prior to trial, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to suppress
the identification testimony of Mr. Rains because of improper
identification procedures (R. 24-28, 31-35).

The trial court

took the motion under advisement and later issued an order
granting the motion (R. 40-41).
At trial, the prosecutor# in his opening statement to
the jury, mistakenly indicated that Mr. Rains "saw the defendant
come out" from the alley.

Defense counsel objected to the

statement (R. 118 at 17). After a discussion at the bench, the
prosecutor made no other similar references during his
explanation of Mr. Rains anticipated testimony, referring to the
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individual seen by Mr. Rains from then on only as the "man" (R.
118 at 17-18).

At the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening

statement, defense counsel, with the jury absent, moved for a
mistrial due to the statement by the prosecutor (R. 118 at 1920).

The trial court denied the motion indicating that the jury

had previously been instructed "that the only evidence that they
are to consider is the evidence that's heard from the witness
stand" (R. 118 at 21). A similar explanation that opening
statements are not evidence was reiterated by both the prosecutor
and defense counsel during their opening statements (R. 118 at
13, 14, 22). 3
The jury found defendant guilty of Burglary, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1982),
and Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404 (1982).

Defendant was sentenced on June 6, 1988, to

serve a term of one to fifteen years for the second degree
felony, and one to five years for the third degree felony, at the
Utah State Penitentiary, to be served concurrently with each
other and consecutively with defendant's current prison sentence
(R. 120 at 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In his opening statement, the prosecutor inadvertently
mentioned the pretrial identification of defendant by Mr. Rains.
3
Defense counsel specifically indicated "[t]here is nothing we
say that you can take to the bank on as far as evidence is
concerned . • . what I am trying to say is that what the
attorneys tell you is not evidence, and the Court has instructed
you at the beginning, and they will also instruct you at the end
of the case, the attorneys' statements is (sic) not evidence" (R.
118 at 22).
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This identification had been suppressed by the trial court as
being improperly obtained.

An objection was raised and the

prosecutor did not refer again to defendant as the person seen by
Mr. Rains.

While this may have called to the jury's attention a

matter which they could not consider because it had been
suppressed, the error was harmless.

The mention was brief and

the trial court's instructions to the jury that only testimony of
witnesses was evidence cured any harm that may have occurred.
When Mr. Rains testified, he did not refer to defendant as the
man he had seen.
The circumstantial and direct evidence, coupled with
reasonable inferences therefrom, which were presented at trial
were sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

The

identification of defendant by Mrs. Rains was based on her having
seen him before, although she had never personally met him.

Her

testimony as to why she recognized defendant immediately was
ample to support her identification.

The identification of patch

cords found in the truck defendant was driving as being similar
to those taken in the burglary of the John home was sufficient,
coupled with Mrs. Rains' identification of defendant as being at
the home, to support the verdict.
The jury instruction given at this trial regarding the
inferences which the jury may draw from defendant's possession of
stolen property did not create an impermissible mandatory
rebuttable presumption.

The burden of proof was not shifted from

the State to the defendant by the instruction.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTOR MAY HAVE ALLUDED TO A
FACT WHICH WAS SUPPRESSED PRIOR TO TRIAL,
SUCH ALLUSION WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO
DEFENDANT AND THUS CONSTITUTED HARMLESS
ERROR.
The State concedes that the prosecutor during his
opening statement to the jury, alluded to the fact that Mr. Rains
had identified defendant.

The trial court had previously

prohibited the State "from using the testimony of Mr. Dean Rains
at any subsequent proceedings to identify Mr. Andrew Quintana"
(R. at 40). Nonetheless, the State disagrees with defendant as
to the magnitude of the error and/or any prejudice, and maintains
that any error was harmless and does not warrant reversal on
appeal.
For purposes of this argument, it is important to
clarify and understand the content and sequence of the
prosecutor's opening statement.

Prior to the alleged error, the

prosecutor stated:
Mr. and Mrs. Rains said [to police] that on
Sunday morning at about eleven, 11:30, right
in this area, that they had observed a man
coming down the street and coming up on the
porch here at the home that belonged to Ted
John.
(R. 118 at 15) (emphasis added).

Following this statement, the

prosecutor indicated that it was only Mrs. Rains who identified
defendant as the man to police, wherein he stated "Mrs. Rains
told the officers that she knew who that man was.
defendant, Andrew Quintana" (R. 118 at 15-16).
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It was

It was only after the above statements, wherein the
prosecutor had Midentified" defendant through the anticipated
testimony of Mrs. Rains, that the alleged error occurred when the
prosecutor continued to identify the "man" as "defendant" in two
brief remarks in his explanation of Mr. Rains' anticipated
testimony.

These brief remarks were as follows: (1) "Mr. and

Mrs. Rains watched the defendant.

He came down cff the porch and

he came back up to the corner" (R. 118 at 16); and (2) "Mr. Rains
came down, made a U-turn and parked on the other side of the
Illinois Street, right next to the alley.
defendant was out of sight.

And he said that the

He didn't know exactly where the

defendant had gone, but essentially he said he saw him come out"
(R. 118 at 16-17).

Upon objection by defense counsel and

following a conference at the bench, the prosecutor continued
with the anticipated testimony of Mr. Rains

without any further

reference to the individual as the "defendant" but only as the
"man".4
Following the conference at the bench, the prosecutor
continued with the anticipated testimony of Mr. Rains as follows:
By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned, is sitting
here in his vehicle, and he sees this man come out of
the area here on the diagram, which is almost adjacent
to where Ted John lives. And he appeared to be
wearing some kind of baggy shirt, something like a
large T-shirt. Appeared there was something up
underneath that T-shirt. He said that initially when
he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for a minute,
almost as if he was going to turn around and go the
other way. Then he turned around and came back down
the alleyway.
He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and went over
and got into something inside that 1983 Mazda pickup
and took off.
Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife, told her to
call the police, and then he went over to Ted John's
house and discovered that the back door was opened and
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Following the prosecutor's opening statement, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial due to the prosecutor's allegedly
improper remarks*
19-21).

The trial court denied the motion (R. 118 at

Defendant in Point I of his brief, contends that the

trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49
(Utah 1981) stated:
[T]he [trial] court has broad discretion in
determining whether a mistrial should be
declared, and a denial of a motion for
mistrial does not constitute an abuse of
discretion where no prejudice to the accused
is shown. The matter is not dissimilar to
that of granting or refusing to grant a new
trial. Such lies within the sound discretion
of the trial judge and this Court will not
reverse his decision thereon in the absence
of an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the limited
circumstances where improper remarks by counsel may be grounds
for reversal.

The Court in State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513

P.2d 422 (1973) indicated:
The test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, [3-] did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and
[2] were they, under the circumstances of the

4
Cont. went in and appeared someone had been in
there, inside the house. He waited and the police
eventually arrived.
One of the things that Mr. Rains was able to do was
to jot down a license plate number for this 1983
pickup truck. He wrote that down and gave that
information to the police department. (R. 118 at 1718).
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particular case, probably influenced by those
remarks. . .
Id, at 426 (emphasis added).

See also State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d

185 (Utah 1986); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984); West
Valley City v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Ut. App. 1987).
In the instant case, even assuming the remarks by the
prosecutor called to the attention of the jury matters which they
would not be justified in considering in determining their
verdict, such error does not warrant reversal.

The remarks may

satisfy the first prong of the Valdez test, but the second prong
is not met.
In Valdez, the Court discussed the second prong,
stating:
The determination of whether the improper
remarks have influenced a verdict is within
the sound discretion of the trial court on
motion for new trial. If there has been no
abuse of this discretion and substantial
justice appears to have been done, the
appellate court will not reverse the
judgment.
Id at 426 (footnote omitted).

In the instant case, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial for it
is clear that the prosecutor's remarks did not influence the jury
verdict for at least two reasons.
First, as the trial court explained in its denial of
defendant's motion for mistrial, the jury was told that any
remarks by counsel were not considered evidence and were not to
be used in reaching a verdict:
[T]he court has already told the jurors that
the only evidence that they are to consider
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is the evidence that's heard from the witness
stand,
(R. 118 at 21)• Furthermore, following the court's cautionary
instruction, the instruction was reiterated by both the
prosecutor and defense counsel.

The prosecutor stated:

As Judge Uno told you, the comments of
attorneys during an opening statement, of
course, are not evidence. Evidence comes
from witnesses who are called to testify, or
it may come in the form of any exhibits that
are received into evidence.
(R. 118 at 13-14).

Defense counsel noted,

There is nothing we say that you can take to
the bank on as far as the evidence is
concerned. . . . [W]hat I am trying to say is
that what the attorneys tell you is not
evidence, and the Court has instructed you at
the beginning, and they will also instruct
you at the end of the case, that the
attorneys' statements is (sic) not evidence.
(R. 118 at 22)

The State recognizes the fact that there is no

certainty that the jury heeded the instructions of the court
above, but such uncertainty exists in most cases and we must
presume the integrity of the jury, where as here, no evidence to
the contrary exists.

See State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517

P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974).
Second, as set forth in Point II, substantial evidence
of defendant's guilt was brought forth during trial, therefore
the prejudicial effect, if any, of two brief remarks at the
beginning of the trial, were minimal and constituted harmless
error.

See Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah Code

Ann. S 77-35-30 (1982) (Hany error, defect, irregularity, or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded'*).
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
DEFENDANT OF BURGLARY AND THEFT.
Petitioner claims that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of burglary and theft.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the
standard of review on appeal when the argument concerns
sufficiency of the evidence.
to the jury verdict.

The Court accords great deference

It is the exclusive function of the jury to

weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.
"The Court should only interfere when reasonable men could not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State
v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah App. 1987), quoting State v.
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).

Furthermore, defendant has

the burden of establishing "that the evidence was so inconclusive
or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the crime."

State v.

Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1985), quoting State v. Kerekes,
622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980); See also State v. Carlson, 635
P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981).
All of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
from the evidence should be reviewed in a light most favorable to
the jury verdict.

When the evidence is so viewed, the Court

reverses only where the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt concerning defendant's guilt. See State v. One
1982 Sivler Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1987),
citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985); See also State
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v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983).

The Court has succinctly

stated that unless there is a clear showing of a lack of
evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld.

See Gabaldon, 735

P.2d at 412; See also State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah
1977).
The statutory requirements of burglary and theft are as
follows:
Burglary — (1) A person is guilty of
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
in a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
Theft -- Elements — A person commits theft
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with the
purpose to deprive him thereof.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 and 76-6-404 (1978).
As defendant concedes, there is no question that a
burglary and theft occurred at the Ted John home on September 27,
1988.

The major issue before the jury and now on appeal is

simply identification.
Defendant contends "the State was unable to produce a
sufficient quantum of evidence to identify Mr. Quintana as the
individual who committed the burglary.

Aside from no competent

identification testimony, the State failed to connect Mr.
Quintana with any of the John's stolen property." (Brief of
Appellant at 17-18).

In light of the substantial evidence placed

before the jury to the contrary, that claim is without merit.
Defendant was positively identified at trial from the
testimony of Mrs. Rains (neighbor of the burglary/theft victim)
as the individual present at the scene of the burglary and theft.
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Mrs. Rains' testimony was corroborated by the description of the
suspect given by her husband.
Mrs. Rains testified that on September 27, 1987 she was
returning home from the grocery store when she observed a
burgundy pickup truck parked on the street and a man standing on
the porch of the John home (R. 118 at 58-59).

As she turned into

her driveway, and from an unobstructed distance of approximately
30 feet, she was immediately able to identify the man standing
upon the porch as defendant (R. 118 at 61, 79). Mrs. Rains
thought to herself "That's Andy", and also recognized his truck
(R. 118 at 59-61, 68). Although Mrs. Rains had never personally
met defendant, she knew who he was. Mrs. Rains often saw
defendant while on her way to work (including only a few days
prior to the burglary/theft) (R.

118 at 68-70) and at other

times, having, she said, "little sisters that always —

when we

go in the car somewhere . . . are always saying there is so-andso" (R. 118 at 78-79).

Mrs. Rains also testified that not only

had she seen defendant "several times", but she believed he may
have been at her home one time with her sister (R. 118 at 70,
79).

Further, upon entering her home, Mrs. Rains told her

husband, who was also observing defendant, that she "knew of him"
(R. 118 at 76). 5

It is interesting to note that defendant not only failed to
set forth in either his Statement of Facts or his Argument, Mrs.
Rains' plausible explanation of identification, but also
erroneously concluded "Mrs. Rains was unable to • . . explain how
she recognized him on the porch of the John home". Brief of
Appellant at 19-20.
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Mrs. Rains watched defendant from her driveway for
approximately five minutes, indicating that at various times he
knocked on the door of the John home, looked in the mailbox,
peered though the large picture window at the front of the house,
and looked around

(R. 118 at 59-60).

She described defendant as

approximately five-feet-six-inches tall, wearing colorful Bermuda
shorts and a T-shirt (R. 118 at 62).

Mrs. Rains later called

police and reported the crime, giving defendant's name, his
physical description, the vehicle description (burgundy
Mazda/Nissan pickup truck with chrome trim and damaged grill) and
7
license number (R. 118 at 64-66, 96).
The variance between the
license number given the police and the actual license number can
be explained by the appearance of 5's and 3's on license plates.
The only difference is that on 5's the downstroke is on the left
and straight down.

The top of the 3's is not rounded but has a

downstroke which angles from the upper right to the lower left.

Defendant contends that Mrs. Rains' testimony is "inherently
unreliable" in that her "physical description of the individual
is inconsistent with Mr. Quintana himself." Evidence at trial
showed that defendant measured five-feet-four-and-three-C[uarters
inches tall (with sneakers), and, when he was stopped by police
hours after the burglary/theft, he was wearing a grey pair of
Bermuda shorts. The height differential is trivial at best, and
it is logical to believe the possibility that defendant changed
his shorts during the hours between the burglary/theft and when
he was stopped by police.
7
Defendant contends that since the name of Mr. Quintema may
not have been dispatched to the police officers involved in the
case, along with the other information provided by Mrs. Rains,
her testimony is inconsistent with the evidence. Not only is
defendant's assertion mere speculation, but both of the officers,
when asked whether the name of Mr. Quintana was given to them,
only responded that they could not recall (R. 118 at 47; R. 119
at 13).
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Mr. Rains testified that while waiting for his wife to
return home, he observed the individual (identified by his wife
as defendant) on the porch of the John home from a distance of
80-90 feet (R. 118 at 87, 100). Mr. Rains had watched defendant
park his truck down the street from the John home (R. 118 at 88,
89).

He described the vehicle as either a Mazda or Nissan dark

maroon pickup truck with the suspension lowered, and with the
front grill "broken out around the headlight" (R. 118 at 89-90).
He also noted the license number of the truck as 5600AK which was
reported to the police by his wife (R. 118 at 50, 65-66, 90). He
described the individual as a Spanish or Mexican male in his midtwenties, approximately five-foot-six to -seven-inches tall, with
light to medium semi-wavy black hair (R. 118 at 87-88).

Mr.

Rains, as had his wife, observed the man acting suspicious on the
front porch of the John home (R. 118 at 88-89).

Later, Mr. Rains

observed defendant come out of the alleyway that ran behind the
John home and proceed to the burgundy colored pickup truck,
carrying something underneath his "baggy" oversized shirt (R. 118
at 93).
Not only did Mrs. Rains personally identify defendant
at trial, but the evidence brought forth at trial confirmed the
accuracy of both Mr. and Mrs. Rains' eyewitness accounts of
defendant and his pickup truck.

Further, the evidence showed

that when defendant was stopped only hours after the
burglary/theft, inside the pickup truck, and in the constructive
possession of defendant, were YAMAHA patch cords similar to the
ones stolen from the Ted John home.
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Reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, there
was sufficient evidence to satisfy all the statutory elements of
burglary and theft, including identification.
POINT III
THE USE OF JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19 WAS PROPER
AS THE INSTRUCTION HAD A FACTUAL BASIS AND
DID NOT CREATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANDATORY
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION.
Defendant claims that Jury Instruction No. 19 was
erroneously included over his objections.

He claims error on the

theory that (1) there was no factual basis for inclusion of the
instruction, and (2) the instruction was a violation of his due
process rights because, he claims, it relieved the prosecution of
its burden to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jury Instruction No. 19 reads:
Possession of recently stolen property, if
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a
circumstance from which you may reasonably
draw the inference and find, in the light of
the surrounding circumstances shown by the
evidence of the case, that the person in
possession knew the property had been stolen.
Thus if you find from the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
was in possession of stolen property, that
such possession was not too remote in point
of time from the theft, and the defendant
made no satisfactory explanation of such
possession, then you may infer from these
facts that the defendant committed the theft.
You may use the same inference, if you
find it justified by the evidence, to connect
the possessor of recently stolen property
with the offense of burglary.
(R. at 82). The State asserts that there was sufficient factual
basis in the evidence to justify instructing the jury as to
inferences it could draw.

This instruction also was proper
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because it did not raise the mandatory rebuttable presumptions
which have been condemned by appellate courts.
A.

There Was a Factual Basis For Giving Jury
Instruction No. 19.

The evidence presented at trial showed that when police
stopped and impounded the pickup truck driven by defendant (upon
suspicion of its use in the commission of the burglary/theft),
Officer Robert Robinson seized from on top of the passenger seat,
and in the constructive possession of defendant, YAMAHA patch
cords which had been reported stolen (R. 119 at 9). The YAMAHA
patch cords were introduced at trial as Exhibit One, and
identified by Ted John, as "very similar" to those stolen from
his home along with his YAMAHA stereo equipment (R. 118 at 33).
Mr. John testified that the specific patch cords taken from his
home, and identified as Exhibit One, were produced primarily for
use with YAMAHA brand stereo equipment ("I recognize that as
unique for YAMAHA brand of stereo") (R. 118 at 33, 42).
Although the State recognizes that Mr. John did not
identify the patch cords with 100% certainty, his testimony that
the cords were "very similar" and "unique" for use in YAMAHA
equipment, when added to the following circumstances surrounding
the seizure, give sufficient factual basis to support the giving
of Jury Instruction No. 19.

First, defendant and the truck

(including the license number) matched nearly exactly the
description reported to police by witnesses at the scene of the
burglary and theft.

Defendant was also positively identified at

trial as the individual present at the scene of the
burglary/theft.

Second, although defendant's brother testified
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that the cords were his, such testimony could reasonably be
considered unreliable by the jury, since he conceded that at the
time of the truck's impoundment, he was in jail for a felony
conviction of burglary himself, and he had also been convicted of
as many as four other felonies since 1982, including burglary,
assault, theft, and escape from prison (R. 119 at 42-45).
Based on Mr, John's testimony and the substantial
circumstantial evidence brought forth, there exists ample factual
basis for Jury Instruction 19.
B.

The Construction of Jury Instruction
No. 19 is Constitutionally Proper.

Defendant next complains that Instruction No. 19
impermissibly shifts the burden of proof from the State and thus
violates his constitutional rights. A comparison of the
instruction given in this case to those which have been held to
be unconstitutional reveals the fallacy of that claim.
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d
321 (Utah 1985), addressed for the first time the use of the
statutory language of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-402(1) in a jury
instruction.

In Chambers, the instruction complained of read:

A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with the purpose to
deprive him thereof.
Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property.
Id. at 324 (emphasis added).

The Court held that the use of that

statutory language in the instruction created a mandatory
rebuttable presumption, "i.e., a presumption which 'instructs the
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jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves
certain predicate facts'" Ld. at 326, quoting Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L.Ed.2d 344
(1985).

The creation of that mandatory rebuttable presumption

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the State to the
defendant and Chambers' conviction was overturned.
That holding was dispositive of the case of State v.
Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) cert, denied 479 U.S. 813, 107
S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986), in which the offending
instruction was "a verbatim recitation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6402(1)."

Id. at 194. The use of the statutory language, with

its inclusion of the term prima facie, created a mandatory
rebuttable presumption and required reversal of Pacheco's
conviction.
The Supreme Court next addressed the issue in State v.
Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986).

In that case, the instruction

complained of read:
Utah law provides that:
"Possession of property recently stolen
when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be prima facie
evidence that the person in possession stole
the property."
Thus, if you find from the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
was in possession of stolen property, that
such possession was not too remote in point
of time from the theft, and the defendant
made no satisfactory explanation of such
possession, then you may infer from those
facts that the defendant committed the theft.
You may use the same inference, if you
find it justified by the evidence, to connect
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the possessor of recently stolen property
with the offense of burglary.
Id. at 1234. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the
grounds that the instruction, while quoting the offending
statutory language, also explained that the law only raised an
inference, not a presumption.

The Supreme Court said:

the court explained that the statutory
language incorporated in the instruction
allowed only an inference of guilt, and then
only if justified by the facts.

Lest there be a misunderstanding of our
ruling in this case, we emphatically declare
that we do not retreat from Chambers. The
trial court should not have used the
statutory language in the instruction for the
reasons stated in Chambers. We hold only
that the instruction cannot be deemed
reversible error in this case in light of the
clear explanatory instructions that all that
the jury could make of the term "prima facie"
was a permissible inference.
Id. at 1234 and 1235-36 (emphasis in original).

See also State

v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075-76 (Utah 1987).
This Court addressed the use of the statutory language
as the jury instruction in State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah
App. 1987).

The trial court in that case had used the statutory

"prima facie" language, then tried to cure it by instructing as
follows:
Instruction No. 19
The term "prima facie" as used herein
means, at first sight; on the first
appearance; on the face of it; so far as can
be judged from the first disclosure;
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presumably; a fact presumed to be true unless
disproved by some evidence to the contrary.
Id. at 1044. The State also argued that boilerplate instructions
regarding the prosecution's burden of proof and reasonable doubt
cured the defect of using the statutory language and defining
"prima facie" in that fashion.

This Court held that the

mandatory rebuttable presumption had been created and the
additional instructions did not cure the unconstitutional taint.
The case most directly on point for the present case is
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987).

It that case, the

Supreme Court said:
If the trial court had instructed in the
language of the statute, it would have erred.
. . . But the court did not so instruct.
Rather, the trial court instructed the jury
as follows: "Under the law of the State of
Utah, possession of property recently stolen,
when a person in possession fails to make a
satisfactory explanation of such possession,
is a fact from which you may infer that the
person in possession stole such property."
This instruction was not defective. . . .
Id. at 456 (citations omitted).

The permissive language of the

instruction in Johnson did not create the mandatory rebuttable
presumption which is unconstitutional.

It was not just a matter

of whether error was reversible as in Smith, no error was
committed when the statutory language was not used and no
presumption was raised.
The language used in Instruction No. 19 in the present
case is not the statutory language.
not mentioned.

The term "prima facie" is

The first paragraph of the instruction is a

paraphrase of the instruction given in Johnson, 745 P.2d 452,
456, which was deemed not to be defective.
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Arguably, the first

paragraph of the instruction in the present case is even more
careful to avoid the presumption.

The last two paragraphs of

Instruction No. 19 are verbatim from the Smith case.

They are

the two paragraphs which the Supreme Court found to be acceptable
and to be curative of the error of including the statutory
language in the first paragraph in the Smith case.
In light of the fact that Instruction No. 19 does not
use the impermissible statutory language and couches the
instruction in terms of inferences which the jury may find, in
light of the evidence, it is a proper instruction and properly
states the law.

It does not violate defendant's constitutional

rights because it does not create a mandatory rebuttable
presumption which shifts the burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, respondent respectfully requests
this Court to affirm the conviction of defendant.

DATED this

n~~

day of May, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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